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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past three years, one of the more discussed issues in
criminal law has been the protection of child witnesses in sexual
abuse cases. Child sexual abuse cases, some of which have received
nationwide attention,' have awakened both the public and state
legislators to the need to protect child victims not only from attack
but also from the emotional trauma of testifying about the experi-
ence in later legal proceedings. Many adults feel uncomfortable
when brought to a courtroom and asked to testify before the very
person they fear the most; presumably, this is even more difficult
* Wallace J. Mlyniec is a Professor of Law and Director of the Georgetown Law Center
Juvenile Justice Clinic.
"Michelle M. Dally is a third year student at Georgetown University Law Center and
the Editor-in-Chief of the American Criminal Law Review.
1. See, e.g., State v. Bentz, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, § 4, at 8, col. I (Scott County
Dist. Ct. Sept. 19, 1984) (two adults from Jordan, Minnesota aquitted after extensive cross-
examination of the children). The acquittal caused the dismissal of charges in cases involv-
ing twenty-two other adults and several children; see also Galante, Calif. Court Clears Tele-
vised Testimony, Nat'! L.J., July 29, 1985, at 1, coL I (discussing People v. Buckey, a recent
case in which the court upheld California's closed circuit television law in a child sexual
abuse case. No. A-750900, A-753005 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct. July 12, 1985)).
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for children.
Responding to a plea for protection, legislators in several
states studied the issue, and as a result, enacted laws that allow a
child to testify via videotape or closed circuit television in an effort
to bring the child's testimony before the jury without subjecting
the child to the presence of the defendant.* In addition, some
states have enacted laws that create a hearsay exception for state-
ments made by child sexual abuse victims.' Although these proce-
dures may protect the child victim, they retreat from two centuries
of trial practice.
Since the demise of wager by battle, wager of laws, and inqui-
2. Commentators have suggested various procedures to alter the courtroom environ-
ment. Technological developments such as closed circuit television, videotape, and sophisti-
cated mirrors have made it possible for the victim to avoid face to face contact with the
defendant without completely altering the traditional courtroom experience. Numerous
states have enacted statutes that provide for the admission of videotaped testimony of mi-
nor victims at sexual abuse trials. See, e.g., Arkansas: ARE. ANN. §§ 43-2035 to -2036
(Supp. 1985) (allowing videotaped depositions of the victim to be admitted into evidence at
trial); Colorado: Cow. Rav. STAT. § 18-3413 (Supp. 1984) (same); New Mexico: N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp. 1984) (same); Wisconsin- Wi. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7) (1985)
(same); California: CAL. PENAL CODE J 1346 (West Supp. 1985) (permitting the alleged
victim's testimony at the preliminary hearing to be videotaped and presented at trial);
South Dakota: S.D. CODImD LAws ANN. § 23A-12-9 to -12-10 (Supp. 1985) (same); Ari-
zona: Asm Rov. STAT. ANN. §1 12-2311 to -2312 (1982) (providing for the alleged victim's
testimony to be videotaped for presentation at trial and allowing the defendant to be pre-
sent during the videotaping); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 90.90 (Supp. 1984) (same) (The legisla-
ture recently amended this statute and added £ 92.54 to make the use of videotape and
closed circuit television more readily accessible. 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-53.); Montana:
MoNr. CoD ANN. § 46-15.401 (1983) (allowing videotaped testimony of the victim to be
admitted at trial); Kentucky: Ky. Rav. STAT. § 421.350 (Supp. 1984) (allowing the video-
taped testimony of the victim to be admitted at trial or permitting the victim's testimony to
be taken in a room other than the courtroom and viewed by the court on closed circuit
television); Texas: Tax. Cam. Paoc. CoDs ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (same); see
also Paper presented by Debra Whitcomb, Assisting Child Victims in the Courts: The
Practical Side of Legislative Reform 17-18, 24-25 American Bar Association National Policy
Conference on Legal Reforms in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, Wash., D.C. (1985) (discussing
videotaping statutes); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions:
Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HAsv. L Rav. 806, 813 (1985) (same).
3. Several states have created new hearsay exceptions so that out-of-court statements
made by child sexual abuse victims can be admitted into evidence. See, e.g., Colorado:
Coo. Rav. STAT. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1984); Florida: 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-53, § 4 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. £ 90.803(23) (1986)); Indiana: IND. CODE ANm. 5 35-37-4-6 (Burns
Supp. 1985); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1983); Maine: ME. Rav. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1205 (Supp. 1984); Minnesota: Mma. STAT. § 595.02(3) (Supp. 1985); South Da-
kota: S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. 5 19-16-38 (Supp. 1984); Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411
(Supp. 1983); Washington: WAsH. Rzv. CoD ANN. I 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1985); see also Mc-
Neil, The Admissibility of Child Victim Hearsay in Kansas: A Defense Perspective, 23
WASHEURN L.J. 265 (1984) (discussing Kansas hearsay statute); Note, supra note 2, at 811
(discussing hearsay statutes); Note, Sexual Abuse of Children-Washington's New Hearsay
Exception, 58 WASH. L. Ray. 813 (1983) (discussing Washington hearsay statute).
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sition, trials have been the primary method of dispute resolution in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. By the seventeenth century, the
English trial had evolved to consist of three principal elements: an
accused, an accuser and an arbiter.4 Each element of the trial had
a clear purpose. The accuser accused; the accused defended; and
the arbiter, either judge or jury in a public forum, heard the case
and determined who was telling the truth.
During the intervening years, courts engrafted a myriad of evi-
dentiary rules, each designed to effect specific goals, upon this sim-
ple trial system. The courts also carved out exceptions, including
various hearsay exceptions, to these rules. Nonetheless, face to face
confrontation before an arbiter in a public forum remains the hall-
mark of Anglo-American dispute resolution.' Accordingly, a court's
use of videotape, closed circuit television, or other evidentiary in-
novations that deny face to face confrontation may endanger a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights notwithstanding their
laudable purposes 7 and approval by state legislatures.
Courts have begun to explore the right to confrontation and
other constitutional problems that the use of evidentiary innova-
tions may produce.8 These innovations clearly implicate a defen-
dant's constitutional right to be present during all phases of his
trial and his right to compel the production and testimony of wit-
nesses on his behalf. The right to be present could limit the use of
all technological innovations and some of the newly formulated
hearsay exceptions because these innovations, by design, prevent a
defendant from confronting his minor accuser face to face. A de-
fendant's right to compel the production and testimony of wit-
nesses on his behalf also could prevent a court's use of some of the
4. Sir William Blackstone referred to the constituent parts of the trial as the actor (the
party who complains of an injury), the reus (the party whom the actor calls upon to make
satisfaction), and the judex (the party who ascertains the truth, applies the law, and secures
the remedy). 3 W. BLACKStONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 25 (9th ed. 1783).
While Blackstone used these terms to discuss private wrongs, the terms also applied to
criminal law, although in the criminal context the king became the accuser. See 4 W. BLACK-
sTONE, supra at 1425; 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISToRY OF ENGLISH LAw 47-50 (3d ed. 1923).
5. For an overview of the evidentiary issues associated with child sexual abuse cases
and some proposed exceptions, see Graham, supra p. 19 (Indicia of Reliability and Face to
Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution, 40 U. MAM L
Rsv. 19 (1985)).
6. These rules and exceptions developed gradually throughout the eighteenth century
and solidified in the nineteenth with the abolition of laws declaring parties themselves in-
competent to testify. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 387-89 (2d ed. 1937).
7. See MacFarlane, infra p. 135 (Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 135 (1985)).
8. E.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
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innovations.
Additionally, a court must consider the impact of the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to represent himself without the as-
sistance of counsel before permitting the prosecutor to use a tech-
nological substitute for the courtroom encounter. A defendant who
makes a timely decision to represent himself generally must be al-
lowed to question the victim in person.
Altering a system that society has accepted as an adequate
method for obtaining the truth and protecting the innocent must
be done with care. To ignore the presumption of innocence and the
importance of procedural guarantees in order to protect an accuser
may hinder the search for truth and lessen the accuracy of fact-
finding. While measures can and should be taken to ease the emo-
tional burden placed on a child witness, the courts must adopt
such measures only to the extent that they truly protect the wit-
ness and do not infringe upon the defendant's right to defend
himself.
II. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT His TRIAL
A. Historically
Courts have long held that the right to be present at one's own
criminal trial is an indispensable feature of the criminal justice
process.' The right existed at common law, and is included in
many state constitutions, 0 criminal codes, and rule books. The
right has gradually gained federal constitutional stature as well.
9. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892); Note, Constitutional
Law-Criminal Defendant Has Absolute Right to Be Present at Trial, 23 VAND. L. Rev. 431
(1970).
10. This article addresses issues involving only the United States Constitution. Eigh-
teen state constitutions use the words "face to face" when describing a defendant's right to
be present at his criminal trial. Delaware: De. CoN&T. art. 1, § 7; Illinois: ILm. CONsT. art.
1, 1 8; Indiana: IND. Comsfr. art. 1, § 13; Kansas: KAN. CONST. § 10; Kentucky: Ky. CONS?.
§ 11; Ohio: OHIo CONST. art. I, § 10; Oregon: OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; Pennsylvania: PA.
CONST. art. 1, § 9; Tennessee: TINN. CONST. art. 1, § 9; Wisconsin: WIs. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
The remaining eight state constitutions limit the right of the defendant to confront wit-
nesses face to face to those witnesses against him. Arizona: AruZ. CONST. art. 2, § 24; Mas-
sachusetts: MAss. CONST. Part 1, art. XII; Missouri- MO. CONsT. art. I, § 18(a); Mon-
tana: MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 24; Nebraska: NEB. CONST. art. I, §11; New Hampshire:
N.H. CONST. Part 1, art. 15; South Dakota: S.D. CONST. art. VI, J 7; Washington: WASL
CONST. art. 1, § 22.
The Mississippi Constitution contains language which indicates that an accused may
not have the right to a public trial in rape cases. Miss. CONS?. art. 3, § 26.
State constitutions may create an even greater right than that found in the United
States Constitution. E.g., Commonwealth v. Willis, No. 84CR346 (Fayette Cir. Ct., Ky. Feb.
20, 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-SC-218-TG (Ky. May 23, 1985).
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The right to be present first gained constitutional significance
as a part of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In 1884, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a conviction
based on the absence-of the defendant during portions of the jury
selection process."' Although the Court's decision in Hopt v.
Utah" was based solely on a territorial statute guaranteeing the
defendant's right to be present at his trial, the Court stated that
the absence of the defendant during the jury selection process, in
contravention of the territorial statute, would violate the United
States Constitution's due process guarantee. 1 In dicta, the Court
stated that the due process clause required the defendant's pres-
ence in the courtroom at all times between the empaneling of the
jury and the reception of the verdict. 4
After Hopt, the Supreme Court heard several other cases that
concerned defendants' presence in the courtroom.'5 Most of these
cases, however, concerned the due process ramifications of failing
to comply with a state statute, 6 as in Hopt, or involved the right
to be present at stages of the trial that are not generally associated
with ascertaining guilt.'7 Notwithstanding the Court's narrow hold-
ing in Hopt, the Court began to cite the case for the more expan-
sive proposition that due process of law requires the accused to be
present at every stage of his trial." In 1933, Justice Roberts recog-
nized the right's significance: "Our traditions, the Bill of Rights of
our federal and state constitutions, state legislation and the deci-
sions of the courts of the nation and the states, unite in testimony
that the privilege of the accused to be present throughout his trial
is of the very essence of due process. '"
In Snyder, the four dissenting Justices stated that after the
grand jury returns an indictment, the fourteenth amendment re-
quires that the defendant be present during all proceedings. 0 The
majority also assumed that the fourteenth amendment required
the presence of the defendant, but limited this requirement to
11. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 577 (1884).
12. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
13. Id. at 579.
14. See id.; Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912).
15. See, e.g., Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922); Frank v. Manguim, 237 U.S. 309
(1915).
16. E.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 354 (1898).
17. E.g., Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 448 (1892).
18. E.g. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 331 (1911).
19. Snyder v. Massachussetts, 291 U.S. 97, 128-29 (1933) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
20. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 129.
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those stages of the trial where the defendant's presence bore a sub-
stantial relationship to his opportunity to defend against the
charges.21 Thus, the majority found no need for Snyder to be pre-
sent during the jury's view of the scene of the crime, because his
absence did not render the trial unfair or unjust."2
The majority in Snyder also suggested that the defendant's
right to be present had its roots in the sixth amendment's confron-
tation clause." The Supreme Court expressed this view as early as
1892, in Lewis v. United States,' where the Court spoke of the
right to be present as entwined with the right to confront witnesses
and accusers.2 Similarly, in Diaz v. United States, the Court con-
strued a Phillipine statute that required the defendant's presence
at trial to be the equivalent of the sixth amendment right of a de-
fendant to confront his accusers." The Court echoed this view af-
ter Snyder as well.'"
Recent cases have not clarified the source of the right."' In Il-
linois v. Allen," the majority discussed the confrontation clause in
relation to the right to be present.30 Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion, however, also contained references to the due process
clause.0' In Rushen v. Spain," the plurality accepted the right to
be present as fundamental without stating its source,"3 while the
21. Id. at 105.
22. Id. at 108.
23. Id. at 106.
24. 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
25. Id. at 373.
26. Diaz. 223 U.S. at 454.55; see also Valdez v. United States, 244 U.S. 432, 453-55
(1916) (Clarke, J., dissenting).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Hayman. 342 U.S. 205, 222 (1952).
28. In United States v. Gagnon, the Court most clearly stated the dual sources of the
right; however, the Court reported its decision in a per curiam opinion and did not give the
parties the opportunity to brief and argue the merits of the case 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1487
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. 397 U.S. 337 (1970). In Allen, the trial judge removed the defendant from the court-
room due to the defendant's repeated disruptive behavior. Id. at 339-41. The Supreme
Court held that the defendant's behavior warranted such action and that the court had not
violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to attend his own trial. Id. at 342.
30. Id. at 338.
31. Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring).
32. 464 U.S. 114 (1983). In Rushen, a juror twice spoke to the trial court judge about a
possible personal prejudice. Neither the defendant nor counsel for either side was present
during the discussion. After defendant's conviction, his counsel learned of the ex parte com-
munication and appealed the conviction on this ground. Id. at 116-17. The Supreme Court
remanded, holding that the trial court's blanket rejection of "harmless error" was error. Id.
at 119, 122.
33. Id. at 117.
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concurring Justice related it to the sixth amendment."
A distillation of the language in these cases suggests that the
defendant's right to be present at his trial is very important but is
subject to expansion and contraction depending on the source of
the right. During the stages of the trial in which the defendant
confronts his accuser and other witnesses, the Court extracts the
right from the sixth amendment. During the other stages of the
trial, where the defendant's presence is substantially related to his
opportunity to defend or where his absence would render the trial
unfair or the outcome unjust, the Court extracts the right from the
fourteenth amendment. While a court may deem the defendant's
absence at some stages to be de minimus and therefore harmless,
core confrontation clause violation might not be harmless error at
any stage.88 Finally, like most rights, the defendant's right to be
present can be waived or forfeited in certain circumstances.36
B. The Lower Courts
Lower courts have been equally inconsistent in their constitu-
tional analysis of the defendant's right to be present at his trial.
Because the courts generally enforce the right, few cases have
arisen where a court prohibited the defendant from attending part
of his trial. The issue of presence most often arises when the de-
fendant has been excluded from a discussion concerning a matter
of law. In United States v. Gore, 3 7 the defendant was absent dur-
ing an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of a co-defendant's
confession. The court rejected the defendant's challenge by sug-
gesting that his presence did not bear a substantial relationship to
his opportunity to defend."
While most courts adhere to this test where the proceedings
concern matters of law, they state that even at these hearings, the
defendant's presence will be required when it may be useful."'
Thus, appellate courts have found a due process violation where
the trial court excluded the defendant from an in camera examina-
tion of the prosecution witnesses' testimony" because the wit-
34. Id. at 129-30 (Stevens, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 129-30 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Snyder v. Massachussett, 291 U.S.
97, 114-18 (1934)).
36. Allen, 397 U.S. at 342-43; Diaz, 223 U.S. at 455.
37. 130 F. Supp. 117 (W.D. Ky. 1955).
38. Id. at 119.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Sinclair, 438 F.2d 50, 52 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. State v. Howard, 57 Ohio App. 2d 1, 5, 385 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1978).
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nesses' statements could have contained inconsistencies of which
only the defendant would be aware. 1 In Brown v. State,' the Su-
preme Court of Alaska found that the defendant's presence during
arguments regarding the admissibility of his wife's testimony
might have caused her to waive her spousal privilege and testify on
his behalf."8 Thus, the supreme court found that his absence vio-
lated his constitutional right to be present. Challenges based on
the defendant's presence at hearings regarding the competency of
witnesses have produced differing results depending on whether
the court believed the defendant could have assisted in his defense
at that stage of the proceeding.4 Consequently, courts permit the
defendant to be present during pretrial determinations of the com-
petency of a child witness if the defendant's presence is necessary
to insure his meaningful defense.
Whenever a court chooses or a legislature directs a trial court
to use evidentiary innovations in order to protect an alleged victim
of sexual abuse, it implicates the preference for face to face con-
tact. A court may employ any of several technological innovations.
A judge may order that testimony be produced on closed circuit
television during the trial, or that prerecorded testimony be pre-
served on videotape for later use. Two-way mirrors and a public
address system can be used to separate the witness from the defen-
dant. Each of these techniques has several variants. The examina-
tions may take place with the witness, lawyers, defendant, and
judge present, and the jury absent but viewing the proceedings
electronically, or with the defendant viewing the proceedings elec-
tronically, either with or without the jury. The court can also iso-
late the victim, while providing him with electronic visual and au-
ral access to the proceedings. Actually, the court can physically
separate any of the participants from the trial and provide elec-
tronic visual and/or aural contact with the proceedings. To avoid
violating the right to be present, the electronic alteration must not
substantially interfere with the defendant's right to confront his
41. Id. at 5, 385 N.E2d at 313.
42. 372 P.2d 785 (Alaska 1962).
43. Id. at 789.
44. Compare State v. Ritchey, 107 Ariz. 552, 555, 490 P.2d 558, 561 (1971) (defendant
did not have a right to be present at a competency determination of a child witness where
defendant's counsel was present) and Moll v. State, 351 N.W.2d 639, 643-44 (Minn. App.
1984) (preliminary competency determination of a child witness is not a stage of the trial at
which the defendant has a right to be present) with United States v. Ashe, 478 F.2d 661, 666
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (defendant has sixth amendment right to be present for competency deter-
mination of a child witness).
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accusers, destroy the defendant's opportunity to defend himself
fully, or result in an unfair trial or unjust outcome."' Finally, the
court must tailor the technological innovation carefully in order to
prevent overbroad application."
State courts have ruled on some of these issues. In Herbert v.
Superior Court,7 a California court disapproved of testimony
taken in a manner that permitted the defendant to hear but not
see the child witness.'" The court based its decision on prior cases
in which the Supreme Court indicated a preference for physical
face to face contact with a witness. ' 9 The court also noted that in
some real but undefined way, a face to face challenge influences
recollection, veracity, and communication.' Similarly, in United
States v. Benfield,5 ' the Eighth Circuit refused to uphold the ad-
mission into evidence of a prerecorded, videotaped deposition of an
adult." The defendant was not present during the taping of the
deposition, but he was in the same building, although the victim
was unaware of his presence.' 3 The defendant observed the pro-
ceeding on a monitor and contacted his lawyer periodically with a
buzzer. When contacted, the lawyer left the room and consulted
with his client." The appellate court, believing that the absence of
face to face contact could have affected recollection, veracity, and
communication, disapproved of this process."
In Hochheiser v. Superior Court,6 the California court of ap-
peal refused to allow a technological innovation in a molestation
trial in the absence of specific legislative authority.'7 The court
45. See United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (Sth Cir. 1878).
46. Cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (The circumstances
under which the press and public can be barred access to criminal trials are limited and the
denial must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.).
47. 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981).
48. d. at 665, 671, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 851, 855.
49. Id. at 667, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 853 (citing Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330
(1911) ("only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial"); Kirby v. United States,
174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) ("witnesses ... upon whom he can look while being tried"); Mattox
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) ("the advantage he has once had of seeing the
witness face to face")).
50. Accord Herbert, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 666-67, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
51. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 821.
53. Id. at 817.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 821.
56. 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, modified, 162 Cal. App. 3d 517a, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 273 (1984).
57. d. at 789, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
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stated that even if closed circuit television could be used in some
cases, a generalized belief in psychological trauma was insufficient
to show the need for it in a specific case." Citing Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court," the court indicated that before a trial
judge authorizes the use of an evidentiary innovation to safeguard
a minor witness, the prosecution must present a factual basis sup-
porting the nature of the potential injury to the witness, its degree,
and its potential duration."
The New Jersey superior court has upheld the use of closed
circuit television where the prosecution clearly showed that the
child victim would suffer probable injury if she testified." The
court permitted a ten-year-old sexual assault victim to testify in a
room near the courtroom while the judge, jury, and defendant re-
mained in the courtroom and viewed and heard the child's testi-
mony via monitors." The defendant, and his lawyer who was in
the room with the child, were in continuous audio contact." The
court distinguished Benfield because of the contemporaneousness
of the testimony." In holding that no violation of the right to be
present had occurred, the court focused on the right to cross-ex-
amine and found that the procedure did not eliminate a meaning-
ful opportunity to exercise this right."
C. Technical Innovations: Some General Guidelines
Although the various court decisions appear to be in conflict,
they present a basis for assessing when the use of technological
innovations violates the right to be present. If the following re-
quirements are met, the technological innovation will not violate
the Constitution. First, there must be a particularized showing of
need to protect the child witness. The need can be based on actual
trauma, or possibly, on intimidation. Second, the chosen procedure
must not deny the defendant a meaningful opportunity to confront
his accusers, assist in cross-examination, or otherwise assist in his
defense. Thus, in-trial contemporaneous closed circuit television
testimony appears to be preferable to pretrial prerecorded video-
58. Id. at 792-93, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
59. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
60. 161 Cal. App. 3d at 793, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
61. State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 433, 484 A.2d 1330, 1343 (Law Div. 1984).
62. Id. at 432. 484 A.2d at 1343.
63. Id. at 442-43, 484 A.2d at 1349.
64. Id. at 424, 484 A.2d at 1337.
65. Id. at 435, 484 A.2d at 1344.
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taped testimony. Additionally, the defendant's lawyer is in the
same room as the witness, and the defendant must be in communi-
cation with his lawyer during the witness's examination. Finally,
the jury should be able to view both the defendant and the wit-
ness, and the defendant must be able to see and hear the witness.
If all of these conditions are met, the only difference between the
innovative examination and a traditional one is the inability of the
witness to see the defendant and the existence of the innovation
itself.
Both Herbert and Benfield support the proposition that face
to face confrontation between the witness and the defendant, and
the appearance of the witness before the jury, are necessary to pre-
serve the psychological impact of the witness on the jury.6 For
years, courts have regarded this impact as a guarantee of veracity.
Physical separation of the witness from the defendant accompa-
nied by the use of dual closed circuit television approximates the
traditional encounter, and arguably does not violate the defen-
dant's right to confront his accuser. Proponents of separation,
however, generally seek to insulate the child from the defendant
completely. Although courts differ as to the effect of this factor on
the right to face to face confrontation, an analysis of this constitu-
tional guarantee suggests that in specific cases, where the prosecu-
tor shows a clear need for separation, a violation of the defendant's
rights will not occur if the court adheres to the above-referenced
procedures. The Supreme Court has approved the admission of a
transcript of previously cross-examined testimony of an unavaila-
ble witness." If this procedure is permissible, a defendant's rights
should not be violated when an available witness is cross-examined
in a slightly altered courtroom."
Although physical face to face contact is important and may
have a psychological effect on the reliability of a witness's testi-
mony, it is not essential to a meaningful opportunity of a defen-
dant to confront his accuser. Thus, separation does not violate the
right to be present during cross-examination. The absence of any
of the above conditions, however, lessens the ability of the defen-
dant to protect himself from unfounded accusations, and increases
the likelihood of a constitutional violation.
66. See Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821; Herbert, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 671, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
855.
67. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 73, 77 (1980).
68. A similar argument could be made for placing the lawyers in a separate room as
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Nonetheless, courts should be reluctant to use these innova-
tions. Both children and adults may experience an unconscious al-
teration of reality when placed under certain pressures. Peer rein-
forcement and improper motives or procedures on the part of the
investigating personnel can affect the subsequent testimony of any
witness.69 Further, even supporters of technological innovations
have acknowledged that the medium of television can alter the im-
pact of a trial on a witness, and the jury's perception of the relia-
bility of the testimony. 0
For over three hundred years, our current trial procedure has
attempted to insure that courts do not convict the innocent. This
is a laudable goal for a workable system. Face to face confrontation
was designed to preserve an efficient balance between the prosecu-
tion and the defense. Although occasionally the process fails, it
should not be replaced hastily with a system that consciously alters
the balance in favor of conviction.
III. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS
A. Historically
One of the rights the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution confers upon an accused is the right to call witnesses
on his own behalf. The right is essential if the defendant plans to
present a defense to the charges against him. The Supreme Court
has discussed few of defendants' constitutional rights as infre-
quently as the sixth amendment right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses. Prior to 1967, the Supreme Court had ad-
dressed the right only five times; twice in dicta and three times
tangentially.71 The Court recognized its importance, nonetheless,
much earlier in American history. During the trials of Aaron Burr,
Chief Justice Marshall upheld the issuance of subpoenas upon
President Jefferson stating that the laws and the power of the
69. See Goodman & Helgeson, infra p. 201-02 (Child Sexual Assault: Children's Mem-
ory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMi L. REv. 201-02 (1985)).
70. See Brakel, Videotape in Trial Proceedings: A Technological Obsession?, 61 A.B.A.
J. 956, 957 (1975).
71. Westn, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L Rev. 73, 108 (1974) (citing
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 n.1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 442
(1932); United States v. Van Duzee. 140 U.S. 169, 172-73 (1891) (dictum that compulsory
process does not require defense subpoenas to issue at government expense); Ex Porte Har-
ding, 120 U.S. 782 (1887); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 364-65 (1851) (dic-
tum), overruled in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918)).
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courts governed even the President.7' President Jefferson complied
with the subpoena and the Court said little else about the clause
for 170 years.
In 1966, the Supreme Court discussed the clause and ex-
panded its literal meaning. In Washington v. Texas," the Court
struck down a statute that prohibited coparticipants in a crime
from testifying on each other's behalf.7 4 In doing so, the Court ex-
panded the scope of the right. The Court held that it not only
guarantees compulsory process to obtain witnesses, but also the
testimony of those witnesses whose presence it secures, as long as
their testimony is relevant, material, and vital to the accused's de-
fense.7" For the next sixteen years, the Court discussed the clause
only tangentially. In 1982, however, the Court further defined the
scope of the right. In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,7" the
Court held that a witness's testimony could be withheld from the
defense if the defendant failed to demonstrate that the testimony
would be both material and favorable to him." In her concurrence,
Justice O'Connor warned, however, that governmental policies that
deliberately place potential defense witnesses beyond the reach of
compulsory process could not be easily reconciled with the clause. 3
Despite the relatively clear standard set forth in Valenzuela-
Bernal, the Court's other statements about the presentation of a
defense suggest that the right may be further qualified. In Wash-
ington, the Court noted that the decision should not be read to
disapprove testimonial privileges or competency rules.79 In Cham-
bers v. Mississippi,80 a complex decision involving confrontation,
compulsory process and due process considerations, the Court rec-
ognized that important rights may bow to accommodate other le-
gitimate interests in the criminal trial process.81 The Court in
Valenzuela-Bernal also rejected compulsory process for witnesses
72. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cases 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). Although
the Court based its decision on the right to compulsory process, it mistakenly cites the
eighth amendment instead of the sixth amendment as the source of this right. Id. at 33.
73. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
74. Id. at 16-17.
75. Id. at 23.
76. 458 U.S. 858 (1982). In Valenzuela-Bernal, the government deported witnesses
before the defense counsel could interview them. Id. at 861.
77. Id. at 873.
78. Id. at 876 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 23 n.21.
80. 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (the right to confront and cross-examine is not absolute).
81. Id. at 295 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972)).
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whose testimony was merely cumulative.2 When these other inter-
ests can restrict the right to compulsory process, Justice
O'Connor's admonition must be taken seriously. Thus, courts must
closely examine the asserted governmental interest and find it sub-
stantial before they deny the defendant the right to subpoena a
witness and introduce his testimony into evidence.
B. Variations
Courts have denied defendants access to witnesses by uphold-
ing privileges in certain situations and overriding them in others.
For example, courts have given the defense access to the identity
and testimony of informers, but only where the defense had shown
this information to be essential to a fair trial.83 Testimony cannot
generally be compelled from those who can properly exercise a
fifth amendment privilege."4 The courts generally have held that
while the compulsory process clause is significant, it cannot be
used to force another person to give up his constitutional rights or
to force the government to accommodate the interests of both peo-
ple.8s The courts have resolved cases involving the reporters' privi-
lege both ways;86 however, the courts have found that the marital
privilege87 and the attorney-client privilege88 will override the com-
pulsory process clause.
Courts also have used judicial economy as a justification to
deny severance of joint defendants where one seeks to testify on
behalf of the other but cannot do so without implicating himself.6 9
Courts will grant severance only when the defendant can show that
the co-defendant actually will testify in an exculpatory, noncumu-
lative fashion so as to further the defense without unduly burden-
ing the court."e Although these practices have not been tested in
the Supreme Court since Valenzuela-Bernal, lower courts consist-
82. 458 U.S. at 873.
83. E.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1980); W. LAFAvE
& J. IszEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 880-81 (1985).
85. See United States v. Reese, 561 F.2d 894, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
86. Compare State v. Rinaldo, 36 Wash. App. 86, 101, 673 P.2d 614, 615-16 (1983) (up-
holding the privilege over demands for testimony based on compulsory process) with In re
Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 268, 394 A.2d 330, 334, cert. denied sub nom. New York Times Co. v.
New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) (upholding the supremacy of the compulsory process
clause).
87. E.g., United States v. Brown, 634 F.2d 819, 826 (5th Cir. 1981).
88. E.g., Valdez v. Winans, 738 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1984).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364, 1370 (5th Cir. 1977).
90. Id. at 1369.
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ently uphold their validity.' 1
C. General Application to Sexual Abuse Cases
Despite these countervailing practices, it is not difficult to see
how the courts may invoke the compulsory process clause to defeat
the new statutes that create hearsay exceptions for the admission
of statements child sexual abuse victims make to other people.
It is conceivable that if courts uphold the hearsay exceptions
when challenged as a denial of the right to confrontation, a defen-
dant may nonetheless invoke his right to compulsory process to
subpoena the child and place her on the witness stand. At least one
court has rejected a statutory challenge based on the confrontation
cluase in part because the defendant did not avail himself of his
right to compulsory process.92 In order to demand the testimony of
the child witness, the defendant will have to show that the evi-
dence is material, favorable to his cause, and not merely cumula-
tive.'9 The defendant will have little difficulty showing that the ev-
idence is material. When the victim is the sole possessor of the
information and that information is the basis of the government's
case, materiality is apparent. To some extent, the notions of
favorable and cumulative are intertwined. If the testimony will
merely reiterate the government's evidence, it is cumulative, and
most likely, not favorable. If the defendant seeks to introduce new
information through the witness, it will not be cumulative, and
most likely will be favorable to his defense.
Courts rarely discuss the concept of "favorable" in the context
of the compulsory process clause. Nonetheless, other areas of the
law provide some guidance. In the context of the government's
duty to provide favorable information to the defendant, most
courts agree that evidence is favorable even if "it does no more
than demonstrate that 'a number of factors which could link the
defendant to the crime do not.' "4 Additional facts and attack on
the credibility of a witness may elicit favorable evidence."
If the defendant seeks to compel the attendance and testi-
mony of the child, his purpose most likely will be to cast doubt
91. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bovain, 708 F.2d 606 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v.
U.S., 464 U.S. 898 (1983).
92. Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (defendant had opportu-
nity to call child as a witness but chose not to do so).
93. See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 873.
94. W. LAFAVE & J. TsRAm, supra note 84, at 760.
95. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
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upon the credibility of the child's story in one of two ways: by im-
peaching the witness using traditional methods, or by bringing to
the attention of the jury other facts that could undermine prior
evidence regarding the identity of the perpetrator or the occur-
rence of the abuse. Arguably, whenever the defendant can cast
doubt upon the credibility of the child's evidence by calling the
victim as his own witness, courts should allow it. If the court de-
nies the defendant access to the child, the compulsory process
clause and the right of the accused to mount a defense require that
the court fashion rules that permit the defendant to attack the
credibility of the child's evidence in another manner.
Little is certain in this area. Commentators have suggested,
for example, that compulsory process issues and confrontation is-
sues should be resolved in a similar manner." Thus, if a child is
unavailable for cross-examination purposes, she also will be un-
available for compulsory process purposes. On the other hand, it
may violate both the compulsory process and confrontation clauses
for the legislature to permit hearsay testimony by assuming un-
availability in all circumstances. Just as Globe Newspaper sug-
gested that the government must make a specific showing of need
before a court can permit an infringement of first amendment
guarantees, a court also may require the government to make a
particularized showing of need before it restricts sixth amendment
guarantees. Nevertheless, the protection of children is at least as
important as judicial economy or evidentiary privilege which tradi-
tionally have been used to override the compulsory process clause.
If the footnote in Washington is given full effect, legislative
prohibitions on access to child witnesses may be permissible.7
Even if these prohibitions are constitutionally permissible, there is
no reason why the balance between the defendant's rights and the
child's protection should be altered to strengthen the prosecution.
Despite sentiments to the contrary, statistical conviction patterns
in these cases strongly resemble those for all felony offenses. 98 In
96. See Westen, supra note 71, at 154-55.
97. Rape shield statutes, which the courts uniformly have upheld, place certain evi-
dence outside the scope of cross-examination without running afoul of either the confronta-
tion clause or the compulsory process clause. See People v. Arenda, 416 Mich. 1, 9-10, 330
N.W.2d 814, 816-17 (1982). Elimination of an issue, however, is less serious than elimination
of a witness.
98. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. D&P'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN, TRACKING OFFEND-
EMs: THE CHILD VICTIM 1 (Dec. 1984) (showing statistics regarding child victims of sexual
assault, other sex offenses, kidnapping, and family offenses in California, New York, Ohio
and Pennsylvania).
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fact, one-half of all child sexual abuse arrestees are convicted as
compared to one-third of all felony arrestees. 9 If these statistics
are accurate, it is possible that the prosecution's problems arise
not from procedural guarantees accorded a defendant at the trial,
but from other events that occur during the processing of the case.
IV. THE RIGHT TO PRO SE REPRESENTATION
A. Historically
In Faretta v. California,100 the Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represent him-
self.10 1 In so holding, the Court stated:
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense
shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused person-
ally the right to make his defense. It is the accused, not counsel,
who must be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion," who must be "confronted with the witnesses against him,"
and who must be accorded "compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor." . . . [Tjhe right to self-representa-
tion-to make one's own defense personally-is thus necessarily
implied by the structure of the Amendment.10s
Therefore, although a defendant may represent himself ulti-
mately to his detriment, "his choice [of self-representation] must
be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the life-
blood of the law.' """s The right is not only accorded to defendants
who have technical knowledge of the law, but also to those who are
aware of the dangers of self-representation and generally know
what they are doing. If a defendant meets these requirements, he
may knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and pro-
ceed to defend himself.
There are limitations on this right. The first limitation in-
volves the timing of the request. A pre-Faretta ruling suggests that
the request is timely if made prior to the commencement of the
trial.10 People v. Windham,1°0 however, indicates that the request
99. Id.
100. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
101. Id. at 819.
102. Id. (footnote omitted).
103. Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
104. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied sub nor. DiBlasi v. McMann, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966) (citations omitted); see also
Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 887 (5th Cir. 1977) (request is timely if made
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must be made within a reasonable time prior to the commence-
ment of the trial.'0 6 In Faretta, the defendant made the request
well before the date of the trial. The Supreme Court obviously
thought that the request was reasonable, but gave no further guid-
ance with respect to the timing of requests for self-representation.
It is clear, however, that where a defendant has ample time to
make a pretrial request for self-representation and fails to do so, a
subsequent in-trial request could summarily be denied as hinder-
ing the orderly process of the judicial system.10 7
A second limitation is that the request for pro se representa-
tion must be clear and unequivocal. 08 Vacillation in requesting a
lawyer ' 09 or permitting a lawyer to do some of the in-court work"1
can constitute waiver of pro se representation. Although the court
may permit a lawyer to assist a defendant upon request, courts
have not held such hybrid representation to be constitutionally
mandated."' Further, the court may order hybrid representation
or standby counsel over a defendant's objection so long as the
counsel's assistance does not go beyond routine, clerical, or proce-
dural matters and does not interfere with the defendant's choice
between tactical alternatives, questioning of witnesses, or represen-
tations on matters of importance. 1 2
A final limitation may be derived from Illinois v. Allen."' If
the purpose of pro se representation is to disrupt or frustrate the
integrity of the court, and it begins to accomplish these goals, the
court may construe the defendant to have forfeited his right to pro
se representation. 14 Similarly, if the purpose is to harrass or intim-
idate a witness, the court also may construe the defendant to have
forfeited the right.1 '
before empanelment of a jury).
105. 19 Cal. 3d 121, 560 P.2d 1187, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 848 (1977).
106. Id. at 127-28, 560 P.2d at 1191, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
107. See Russell v. State, 270 Ind. 55, 63-64, 383 N.E.2d 309, 315 (1978).
108. Anderson v. State, 267 Ind. 289, 294, 370 N.E.2d 318, 320 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1079 (1978) (citations omitted).
109. United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 51 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925
(1976).
110. United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 907-08 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Pegram v. United States, 400 U.S. 958 (1970) (acceptance of counsel's assistance during pre-
trial period and early stages of trial constitutes an intent to be represented and may result
in a denial of a subsequent request for self-representation).
111. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 944, 953-54 (1984).
112. Id. at 951, 954.
113. 397 U.S. 337 (1970); see supra note 29.
114. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 343.
115. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
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B. General Application to Sexual Abuse Cases
There is little to prevent a defendant from representing him-
self in a child sexual abuse case. If the defendant makes the re-
quest timely, unequivocally, and with full understanding of its con-
sequences, the court must grant it. Consequently, if the prosecutor
makes a pretrial request for a technologically innovative method of
taking testimony,"' the defendant may frustrate this tactic by re-
questing to defend himself. Since many defendants in sexual abuse
cases are not indigent, they will be able to derive maximum benefit
from their retained counsel even if the court does not permit active
hybrid representation during the trial itself. Consequently, the
prosecutor may be forced to forego closed circuit television and
prerecorded videotaped testimony or subject the victim to the
more intimidating process of questioning by the defendant
himself. 1 7
It is unlikely that a court will find that the purpose of a re-
quest for a pro se defense is disruptive or an affront to the integ-
rity of the court. Invocation of a constitutional right is not in itself
disruptive or an affront to the integrity of the judicial process.
Globe Newspaper, Allen, and Faretta all suggest that specific in-
stances of contumacious conduct must occur before the court can
deny a defendant his right to pro se representation. It is unlikely
that the request itself will reach the level of disruption or intimi-
dation usually associated with the forfeiture of the right. Courts
sometimes have held that if a defendant makes threats during the
act of abuse, he waives (or more precisely, forfeits) his right to con-
frontation,"' there must be a specific showing of the relation be-
tween the defendant's improper activities and the witness's reluc-
tance to testify before the court denies the right to self-
representation. Assertion of a right cannot be equated with a
threat to the victim. Although the specter of the defendant's ques-
tioning may not be pleasant for a witness, it cannot be construed
to be misconduct per se.
U.S. 914 (1977).
116. The prosecutor ordinarily must make the request before trial.
117. In fact, a proposed bill by the District of Columbia Council on the Judiciary will
place the child victim in a small enclosed room with the prosecutor and the defendant's
attorney. If a defendant chooses to represent himself, the child, in essence, will be locked
into a potentially threatening situation. This fact was brought to the Council's attention
during testimony. The bill is still pending. See Council of the District of Columbia Bill No.
6-145 entitled "District of Columbia Testimony by Minor Victims in Sexual Offense Prose-
cutions Act of 1985."
118. State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 441, 484 A.2d 1330, 1348 (Law Div. 1984).
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Once questioning begins, the court retains some discretion in
controlling the examination so that the witness is not intimidated
more than he would be during normal cross-examination. This con-
trol includes declaring the right forfeited if the defendant goes be-
yond the bounds of vigorous defense and begins to intimidate the
witness or impugn the integrity of the court.'
Nothwithstanding this control, prosecutors must be made
aware that the tactics which they use to insulate a child witness
may result unwittingly in a lessening of their prosecutorial advan-
tage, and an increase in discomfort to the child witness. Moreover,
due to the speed with which legislators are acting in this area, they
may fail to carefully balance the concerns of the defendant and the
child witness. Legislation should not presume guilt and seek to in-
sure conviction. On the other hand, legitimate weapons in the
hands of the defense should not frustrate all efforts to protect the
child witness.
V. CONCLUSION
Skilled .defense lawyers always will find ways to challenge and
sometimes will overcome the various methods prosecutors use to
protect child witnesses. Rather than spend time trying to create
procedures to spare children from the anxiety that occurs during a
trial, legislators should attempt to improve investigative tech-
niques so that children will be traumatized less during the early
stages of the case. 20 Multiple interviews conducted by insensitive
and untrained police and other government agents do at least as
much damage to children and to the prosecution's case as a court
appearance by the child."' Rather than improve the process at the
expense of the Constitution, legislators should improve pretrial
procedures and investigative practices first.
119. A court should consider a case carefully before making such a ruling. Mid-trial
forfeiture of the right to a pro se defense could be grounds for a mistrial. If an appellate
court reverses the trial court's decision, a retrial could violate the double jeopardy clause.
120. See Berliner, infra p. 169-172 (The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging
Limitations 40 U MIAMI L. Rev. 169-172 (1985)).
121. See Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 69, at 200.
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